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INTRODUCTION
Before responding to the merits of Appellee's brief, it is important to note that the
Appellee relies primarily on the cases of Dunn v. Dunn and Woodward v. Woodward,
decided in 1990 and 1982, respectively. Conspicuously missing from her legal argument
is any authority from the past decade. In fact, the two most recent cases she cites (from
1999 and 2002) are presented exclusively for standard of review purposes and are not
later mentioned, discussed, or analyzed. The Appellee simply ignores the recent Utah
cases that have a direct bearing on the issues presented to this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT THIS COURT FIND DR. KEITER'S MEDICAL
PRACTICE AND ITS BANK ACCOUNTS, WHICH HELD INCOME
FROM HIS SEPARATELY-OWNED BUSINESS THAT WAS NEVER
COMMINGLED WITH MARITAL FUNDS, TO BE HIS SEPARATE
PROPERTY.
The Appellee incorrectly indicates that the value of the John E. Keiter M.D. P.C.

(MDPC) has been resolved by stipulation. That stipulation, which contemplated
Appellant's retirement, did not address the value of the medical practice at the time of
divorce but simply concluded that in the event of the sale of the MDPC, the sales
proceeds, after the payment of all legitimate debt, would be divided equally. (R. 640:474,
509). Appellee incorrectly framed the unresolved issue as the character of Dr. Keiter's
earnings during the marriage.
Lest the court become confused, the real issue in this case is the ability of spouses
to own and hold separate property during their marriage and more specifically, the
characterization of bank accounts used in the medical practice, on which Ms. Keiter had
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no signatory authority, that existed before the parties' marriage and which housed Dr.
Keiter's separately-owned and managed property.
Appellee attempts to characterize all income from the medical practice as marital
property without regard to its use rather than limiting the marital portion to Dr. Keiter's
actual salary or income applied to a marital purpose or obligation. Yet, if the medical
practice is deemed Dr. Keiter's separate property, then income generated therefrom is
also separate. Compare Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(stating the rule that each spouse "retain[s] the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property.") with Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ^ 34, 176 P.3d 476 (stating that income produced from a
marital asset is marital property). In other words, a medical practice or business can have
earnings and increased value that is not realized by its owner and that never becomes
marital property, especially where the non-owning spouse does not have the requisite
involvement to claim a share of the owner spouse's separate property. See e.g., Jensen v.
Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, 203 P.3d 1020 (awarding the total equity of a closely-held
corporation received by the husband prior to marriage to the husband as his separately
held property); Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, 190 P.3d 497 (affirming trial
court's award to husband of ranch assets, including equipment and accounts receivable,
as his sole and separate property); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992)
(awarding husband's premarital dental practice to husband and holding that "[i]t would
not be equitable to require him to pay his wife part of the value ascribed to the goodwill,
because the goodwill of a sole practitioner is nothing more than his or her reputation for
4

competency[.]"). Thus, Dr. Keiter's earned salary or income applied to a marital purpose
or obligation is distinctly different than the earnings from the practice that are separately
held, administered, and used to maintain and enhance the practice or Dr. Keiter's sole and
separate property.
According to Appellee's brief, earnings from the medical practice can only be
classified as (1) marital earnings or (2) value attributable to the practice. Appellee's Brief
17. This ignores the possibility that some earnings from the practice can be separate
property. Because the parties reached a stipulation to equally divide any net value from
the medical practice received upon its sale, Appellee erroneously assumes that the
practice itself is a marital asset and thus that the medical practice accounts can
necessarily only contain marital earnings. Appellee's Brief 20, 30. The first assumption is
completely incorrect based on the record. See R. 640:474 (stating that the parties'
stipulation was "in no way indicating that the practice or the John E. Keiter, M.D.P.C. is
a marital asset."). Consequently, Appellee's second assumption also fails.
First of all, the medical practice accounts had a balance before the parties'
marriage; this balance was indisputably Dr. Keiter's separate property. Second, while no
case has specifically addressed the issue, there appears to be no prohibition against the
ability of spouses to allocate marital earnings between each other such that they each
acquire separate property. For example, gifts that a spouse receives during the marriage
are presumptively his or her separate property. See Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, f
10, 203 P.3d 1020 (stating the general rule). Thus, it seems entirely possible that a gift
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could be given from the marital estate to spouses individually and that such a gift would
transform marital property to separate property where such intent is manifest.
Appellant does not assert that his income during marriage is non-marital; rather
Appellant's position is that the medical practice bank accounts are and were his sole and
separate property into which he alone could deposit and withdraw separately-held funds.
Appellee maintains that marital property includes uall property acquired during the
marriage" and cites Dunn for the proposition that all of a parties' earnings during
marriage are marital. Appellee's Brief 18. Dunn, however, is markedly different from the
present case in that the medical practice of Dr. Dunn was incorporated during the course
of the marriage and Ms. Dunn worked in that practice without compensation. Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this case, Dr. Keiter established his
medical practice more than seven years before his marriage to Ms. Keiter and she
provided no services, work, or effort to or for the practice save only services provided on
an emergency basis or prior to the parties' marriage for which she was paid. (R. 488-89,
640:421,426).
Appellee would like to give the blanket definition of marital earnings to the
MDPC accounts. But that approach disregards the long-recognized ability of spouses to
acquire and keep certain property as separate property during marriage.
Under Utah law, it is entirely possible for spouses to acquire and hold separate
property during the marriage. See e.g., Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 2009 WL
2619225 (payments from stock sale); Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329, 2007 WL
2965127, at *1 (real property purchased during the marriage). In determining whether
6

certain funds are separate or marital, courts look at parties' "actions as a whole." See
Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 4. The parties' intent is of paramount consideration. Id. f
28 (noting that "[wjife's actions manifested an intent to keep [certain stock proceeds]
separate" although the funds rested for a time in a joint marital account); see also
Arnason v. Arnason, 2002 UT App 243, 2002 WL 1580762, at *1 n.l (noting that the
"transfer of otherwise separate properly to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse" does
not change the nature of separate property to marital property unless "coupled with an
evident intent to do so[.]" (quoting Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373,1J 22, 993
P.2d 887)). Furthermore, the payment of family expenses from a personal account does
not change the separate nature of that personal account. Even though separate property
may have a "de facto marital character when present in [ ] joint accounts or used to
purchase family items," the funds remain separate when present in a spouse's individual
account. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 4 (finding that monthly payments which wife
received for the sale of stocks during the marriage remained her separate property even
when temporarily deposited into a joint account).
In this case, the medical practice accounts of Dr. Keiter were opened, established,
maintained, and acquired prior to the parties' marriage. (R. 493, 501-02). The funds in
the accounts were never commingled or transferred, even temporarily, into any joint
account or even an account to which Ms. Keiter had access. (R. 502). Thus, the accounts
were and remain Dr. Keiter's separate property. Although Dr. Keiter did, in fact, deposit
earnings from his practice into his separate accounts, he also deposited funds into Ms.
Keiter's separate account, thus manifesting an intention that the parties each retain
7

separate property. (R. 502). Moreover, Ms. Keiter had her own separate earnings during
the marriage (from employment and child support), which she kept in her separate
account and did not commingle with Dr. Keiter's funds. (R. 640:378, 414, 434-35). The
marital portion of Dr. Keiter's earnings includes only those funds which were transferred
to Ms. Keiter's separate account and those funds used to pay for family expenses. The
parties, by choice, had no joint accounts. Moreover, Ms. Keiter had no signatory
authority on the medical practice accounts, which further emphasizes an intent to keep
certain property separate. (R. 639:148, 640:434). Although Dr. Keiter paid family
expenses, such as credit card bills, out of the business accounts, that act does not change
the character of the business accounts nor does it contravene Dr. and Ms. Keiter's
otherwise clear intent to hold separate accounts. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233,f 28
II.

DR. KEITER THROUGH HIS PRE-MARITAL DEFINED BENEFIT
PENSION PLAN ACQUIRED AN INTEREST IN THE SNOW BASIN
PROPERTY BEFORE THE MARRIAGE AND THE SNOW BASIN
PROPERTY WAS PAID FOR WITH HIS SEPARATE FUNDS.
It is entirely possible for spouses to acquire and hold separate property during

marriage. See supra. Yet, the Appellee ignores this well-established principle, claiming
instead that everything which stems from MDPC earnings (including the Snow Basin
Property) is marital. Using Appellee's framework of timing, source, and improvements, it
becomes evident that the trial court mischaracterized the Snow Basin Property as marital
when it has always been and remains the separate property of Dr. Keiter.
Regardless whether a portion of the contract payments on the Snow Basin
Property was paid during the parties' marriage, that property was acquired by Dr. Keiter
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(through his retirement plan) prior to his marriage to Ms. Keiter with the clear intention
to keep the property separate. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that anything a person acquires before marriage is separate property).
The Snow Basin Property was purchased in 1981. (R. 491). The parties married on
February 6, 1982. (R. 487). This means that the 1980 retirement plan and the Snow Basin
Property which the plan held belonged solely and separately to Dr. Keiter at the time of
the parties' marriage. Although a finding of commingling or enhancement can alter the
characterization of separate property, no such finding exists in this case nor would the
evidence justify such a finding or conclusion. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405,
If 20, 147 P.3d 464 (outlining how separate property loses its identity and becomes
marital).
Additionally, all expenses for and improvements on the Snow Basin property were
paid from Dr. Keiter's separate accounts, thus making a commingling argument
untenable. (R. 501-502, 504, 508). The Court received evidence of and accepted the fact
that two payments were made toward the Snow Basin Properly after the parties'
marriage—one in 1987 from one of Appellant's MDPC accounts and one in 1988 from
Appellant's retirement account. (R. 496). Both of these payments toward the property
were made from Dr. Keiter's separately held and controlled accounts, on which Appellee
had absolutely no signatory authority. (R. 493, 501-502, 639:148). We note that the
Appellee is not claiming that she made any payments from her separate bank account.
Nor is she claiming that payments were made from a joint account of the parties. Rather,
she wishes to enjoy the benefit of having her own separate bank account while
9

simultaneously categorizing all of Dr. Keiter's accounts as marital. In this case, Ms.
Keiter applied no personal, separate funds toward the Snow Basin Property. At best, her
claim is that marital funds were used to pay for and improve the property, which they
were not.
Even assuming that some payments on the Snow Basin Property came from Ms.
Keiter personally or from a commingled account, the appropriate course of action would
be a possible reimbursement to Ms. Keiter or the marital estate for these payments or
contributions rather than finding a complete change in the character of the property. See
Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329, 2007 WL 2965127, at *2 (affirming trial court's
order of reimbursement to husband of money he contributed toward the landscaping and
tiling of wife's separate property). A piece of separately held real property does not
automatically become a marital asset where the non-owner contribution is traceable. Id. at
*2 n.2.
One of Appellee's primary arguments for characterizing the Snow Basin Property
as marital is that the property was acquired at "a significant financial cost to the marital
estate." Appellee's Brief 31. This statement is completely untrue; yet, Appellee distorts
die facts to hide the truth.
First, the value for the Snow Basin Property which Appellee puts forward
($110,000) is a value that the trial court found "hard to accept" because it represented
only one-third of the property's purchase price and twelve years had elapsed since the
property's purchase. (R. 505-06). As of September 2006, Snow Basin Property was
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valued at $2.3 million. (R. 506). Thus, it is entirely misleading for the Appellee to state
that expenditures to Snow Basin exceeded the property's value. Appellee's Brief 31.
Second, the Appellee is assuming that all payments, taxes, and improvements to
the Snow Basin Property came from the marital estate. In truth, the only known payments
on the property during the parties marriage came from the Appellant's separately held
retirement account and a separately held MDPC account. (R. 496, 514, 639:189-196). All
the property taxes for Snow Basin were paid out of one of Dr. Keiter's MDPC accounts.
(R. 501-02). Likewise, the improvements to Snow Basin were funded through Dr.
Keiter's separately held MDPC account and his personal account. (R. 508). Moreover,
the penalty taxes for the distribution of the Snow Basin Property to Dr. Keiter came from
Dr. Keiter's personal account. (R. 504). Even though the trial court found Dr. Keiter's
personal bank account to be "marital funds," there is no legal basis for treating all of Dr.
Keiter's separately held bank accounts as a "repository for marital earnings." (R. 504);
Appellee's Brief 29. Such treatment disregards the ability of spouses to maintain
separate property during marriage and is inconsistent given that Ms. Keiter's separate
account, which housed her earnings and separate income, was at no point treated as a
marital asset. (R. 639:148-49).
Lastly, while some improvements were made to the Snow Basin Property after it
was transferred to Dr. Keiter, these improvements were not made jointly, as Appellee
suggests. Ms. Keiter's contributions and/or enhancement to the property must be
significant in order for there to be commingling and a subsequent change of the
property's character to a marital asset. See Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, % 14, 203
11

P.3d 1020 (stating that the recent trend as seen in the cases of Dunn and Elman is "to
require more active participation and contribution by the nonowner spouse"). In this case,
Ms. Keiter had little to no involvement in improving the Snow Basin Property. She did
not participate in decision making, which alone would be insufficient for her to claim an
interest. See Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, t 19 n.5, 190 P.3d 497 (denying wife
a one-half interest in real property belonging to husband based on the high level of
involvement required to support a finding of commingling or enhancement). There is no
evidence that Ms. Keiter applied any personal money or effort toward the Snow Basin
Property. (R. 496, 508). In truth, she visited the property only a handful of times and
always with Dr. Keiter. (R. 640:454-55). Accordingly, Ms. Keiter has acquired no legal
interest in the Snow Basin Property. The clear weight of the evidence shows Dr. Keiter's
intention to keep the Snow Basin Property separate.
In spite of Appellee's arguments why the Snow Basin Property was titled in Dr.
Keiter's sole name at the time of its distribution from the defined benefit pension plan,
she cannot explain away the clear and simple fact that title was at no point ever put in her
name in spite of time and opportunity to do so. (R. 500, 639:183-86). This fact alone is
evidence of Dr. Keiter's intent to keep the Snow Basin Property as his separate property.
The Snow Basin Property was distributed to Dr. Keiter individually in 1994. (R. 499500). The parties divorce petition was not filed until October 14, 2004. (R. 1-10). Thus,
there was a ten-year period during which Dr. Keiter could have transferred, but did not
transfer, the Snow Basin Property into Ms. Keiter's name in whole or in part.
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Dr. Keiter made a conscious choice to not transfer title to the Snow Basin Properly
to Ms. Keiter or otherwise give her an interest in the property because "she viewed it with
disdain." (R. 639:198). The Court in its Memorandum Decision also noted that Ms.
Keiter was "during the marriage less enthused about its [the Snow Basin Property's]
potential." (R. 508). In stark contrast, the Snow Basin Property was Dr. Keiter's
passion—something he viewed as wonderful and worth working for. (R. 640:455;
639:198). Dr. Keiter "believe[d] the Snow Basin property to be a sort of 'paradise' and he
had visions of its highest and best use[.]" (R. 507).
Although Appellee has attempted to draw out some significance from the fact that
Snow Basin was owned initially by the John E. Keiter MDPC Defined Benefit Pension
Plan and then transferred to Dr. Keiter personally, the law does not restrict those holding
separate property to keep title unchanged during the course of ownership. See Burt v.
Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the character of separate
property can be preserved so long as the separate property has not lost its identity.).
Moreover, the Burt case, which Appellee cites for the proposition that "ownership before
and after the transfer [from one medium investment to another] would be identical" has
no such holding. See id.; Appellee's Brief 23.
In this case, the distinction between Dr. Keiter and his medical corporation is one
without legal difference. The MDPC is Dr. Keiter's separate property, so whether the
Snow Basin Property was held by the corporation or by Dr. Keiter has no bearing on the
fact that the Snow Basin Property is and was Dr. Keiter's separate property. See supra I.
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Appellee's reliance on Woodward to resolve the issue before this Court is
misplaced. The Snow Basin Property was acquired by Dr. Keiter's premarital defined
benefit pension plan prior to the marriage. (R. 491). The property was distributed to Dr.
Keiter personally, pursuant to legal advice, during his marriage to Appellee and before
any divorce petition was filed in order to avoid a problem with overfimding. (R. 499500). The assets which were rolled over into a new retirement plan adequately
represented the benefit in which the parties both had a legal interest. At all times, the
identity of the Snow Basin Property and payments made toward it remained clearly
identifiable. Thus, the characterization and distribution of the Snow Basin Property does
not fit within any type of Woodward analysis. Even were the Woodward formula to be
used for purposes of an allocation of interest in the Snow Basin Property, Ms. Keiter
might claim, at most, one-half of the interest that is deemed marital—not a full one-half
interest of the property. See Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433-34 (Utah 1982)
(stating that the wife is entitled to one half of the "portion of the retirement benefits
represented by the number of years of the marriage divided by the number of years of the
husband's employment."). Expert witnesses have previously testified as to the
appropriate marital percentage of the parties' retirement benefits. (R. 512).
CONCLUSION
The Appellee's brief is unpersuasive because it fails to address, analyze, or
distinguish recent applicable Utah case law. No Utah law has ever prohibited or restricted
the right of a party to own and maintain separate properly during marriage. Utah law has,
in fact, supported the ownership of separate property during a marriage absent
14

commingling or substantial effort to enhance the value of separate property by the nonowner spouse. The overriding consideration for determining whether separate property
has become marital is the parties' intent. The facts in this case showed that Dr. Keiter did
everything possible to keep both his medical practice and the Snow Basin Property as his
sole and separate property. In spite of such clear intent, the trial court failed to categorize
the MDPC as Dr. Keiter's separate property and erroneously found the Snow Basin
Property to be marital. As detailed and delineated above, the medical practice was and is
the sole and separate property of Dr. Keiter. The record is devoid of any intent to transfer
or share interests in the medical practice, its assets, or the Snow Basin Property. Based on
the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
Law and Decree of Divorce because the trial court did not divide the marital estate as
required by law—an error that amounts to a clear abuse of discretion.
Dated this /ffijfday of September 2009.
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Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant John
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